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Abstract. In a sitting whereby a user interacts with multiple service
providers, each service provider is likely to follow different privacy regu-
lations according to the nature of the industry it belongs and the appli-
cable legislative requirements. We propose a protocol that escrows users
private information which is bound to multiple set of conditions in a fed-
erated single sign-on environment. An identity-based proxy re-encryption
scheme is applied along with trusted computing technologies. A perfor-
mance analysis is provided to show the increased performance of our
protocol in comparison to the existing anonymous credential approach.
The security properties of the protocol is formally evaluated using the
coloured petri nets and state-space analysis techniques.
1 Introduction
Consider a user ua who in a sitting purchases a prescription medicine, posts
some comments in two online forums (Forum A and Forum B), and bids for
an auctioned item. For privacy reasons, ua can be anonymous. However, for
accountability purposes, some of ua’s personally identifiable information (PII)
may have to be revealed when certain conditions are met. Due to the different
legislative requirements between different industries, countries, and/or states,
the conditions under which ua PII can be revealed are likely to be different from
one service provider to another. For example, the pharmacy may require ua PII
to be revealed if the medicine purchased is found to have serious side-effects, the
auction site may need ua PII if he/she wins the auction, and the online forum
may need the PII if ua posted some illegal material. Assuming that Forum A
and Forum B reside in different countries, what constitutes ’illegal material’ may
also be different.
In such a situation, each of these service providers (SPs) needs to have cor-
rectly escrowed ua PII under its respective conditions before providing the ser-
vices. We call this process the conditional revelation of PII (CRPI).
The existing anonymous credential system (ACS) [1] provides many privacy
enhancing capabilities. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on its CRPI ca-
pability. This is accomplished through the execution of a PII escrow operation
whereby, using a combination of encryption, signature, and zero-knowledge proof
techniques, a user’s PII is verifiably encrypted under a set of cryptographically-
binding conditions. The result of such an operation is a ciphertext which cor-
rectly hides some certified PII. It can only be decrypted by a trusted anonymity
revocation manager (ARM) when the conditions are satisfied.
Using the existing PII escrow operation, if ua interacts with r-number of
SPs in a session, then r-number of PII-escrow operations have to be performed
because each of the PII escrow operation cryptographically binds a user’s PIIs
to a set of conditions Condx which are specific to SPx in that session only.
Such a one-to-one mapping is required due to, as explained earlier, the different
legislative requirements between industries, countries, and states.
Furthermore, even if ua only interacts with SPs who are all bound by the
same legislative requirements, a one-to-one mapping of conditions improves ac-
countability. The conditions used between a user and an SP must contain the
identity of the SP involved in that transaction. Consequently, since the condi-
tions are cryptographically-bound to the ciphertext, when the conditions are
satisfied, the decryption of the PII can be technically linked to that particular
SP only. As a result, if the revealed PII is abused in the future (such as unau-
thorised sharing of PII), we could trace the root of such an abuse to only those
SP(s) who have received the revealed PII.
Nevertheless, the existing PII escrow operation is inefficient. A PII-escrow
operation requires many resource-intensive cryptographic operations (generation
of commitments, encryptions, and execution of zero-knowledge proof protocol).
Having to perform such an operation multiple times in a sitting will easily result
in a poor performance, and subsequently, reduce its usability to the users. This
problem is aggravated for users with limited-power devices. Furthermore, it relies
on a single trusted ARM for a correct PII revocation procedure.
The contribution of this paper is a protocol called the Private Information
Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP) which allows a user
to bind her escrowed PII to multiple sets of conditions (each to be used with
different SP) while only having to perform the resources-intensive PII-escrow
operation once. Furthermore, PIEMCP reduces the trust placed on the ARM
and achieves a significantly better performance in comparison to the existing ap-
proach [1]. We achieve this by extending the existing ACS into a federated single
sign-on (FSSO) environment [2,3] using the trusted platform module (TPM) [4],
secure processor [5], and identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBEPRE) [6–8]
technologies. The application of ACS in an FSSO environment has been previ-
ously proposed [9], however, the problem of binding PII escrowed under multiple
conditions is not addressed. Finally, as the PIEMCP is complex, we have for-
mally verified its security properties using a formal method tool: the colour petri
nets (CPNs) and state space analysis techniques.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 details the security requirements
and the threat environment for PIEMCP. Section 3 describes the notations used
and a brief description of the cryptographic schemes and the TPM technologies
employed. Section 4 details the PIEMCP. Section 5 provides a formal analysis
of the security properties of the PIEMCP. Section 6 analyses the performance of
PIEMCP in comparison to the existing approach. Conclusion and future work
are provided in section 7.
2 Requirements and Threats
The main entities involved in the PIEMCP are users (u), identity providers
(IdPs), service providers (SPs), and an anonymity revocation manager (ARM).
Security requirements: the security requirements for a privacy-preserving system
have been previously proposed [10–12]. In this paper, we focus on the require-
ments needed for the PIEMCP by adding and extending some of the existing
requirements from the cited references.
Multiple conditions: at the end of every session, the PII escrowed must be
bound to multiple sets of conditions, each to be used with a different SP. Account-
able PII Disclosure: in the process of revealing a user PII due to the fulfillment
of some conditions, the end result should be the revelation of the PII to only
the SP as stated in the conditions and nobody else. Authenticated PII: Prior to
conditions fulfillment, IdPs, SPs, and referees must not learn the value of the
user’s PII but at the same time be convinced that its encryption is correct; when
conditions are fulfilled, the revealed PII must indeed be a correct certified PII.
This requirement implies the confidentiality, conditional release, and revocation
properties detailed in [10]. Enforceable conditions fulfillment : A user’s PII should
never be revealed before all designated referees agree that the cryptographically
bound conditions are satisfied. This requirement is used in [11], and it is similar
to the privacy policy, obligations, restrictions, and enforcement properties de-
tailed in [10]. Conditions-Abuse resistant : An SP and an IdP must not be able
to fool the user to encrypt the PII, or the VE private key, under a set of condi-
tions different from those originally agreed. Similarly, an SP or IdP must not be
able to successfully revoke the user’s PII using conditions different from those
originally agreed. This requirement is extended from the more generic Abuse
resistant property defined in [11].Session Unlinkability : SPs and IdPs must not
be able to link a user from one escrow session to another from the session data
gathered.
Threats: we consider threats that arise from malicious users, IdPs, SPs. A precise
explanation of the types of attacks that these entities can do is provided in
Section 5. A malicious users may provide false PII (for escrow) and may attempt
to cause unsuccessful revocation of the escrowed PII even when the conditions
bound are satisfied. Malicious IdPs and SPs may attempt (individually or in a
collusion) to reveal the escrowed PII in an un-authorized manner (such as when
conditions are not fulfilled yet). As is common in an FSSO model, SPs trust
IdPs. Collusion between users and IdPs or SPs is unlikely due to conflicting
interests: users want to protect their PII, while IdPs and SPs want the exact
opposite (the revelation of the PII). We assume ARM to be opportunistic but
risk averse, that is, it is trusted to execute its tasks honestly and not to collude
with the IdPs and SPs, however, it will attempt to learn the value of the PII
when the effort required is trivial. By trivial, we mean the ability to obtain users
PII without having to leave any detectable traces (such as communication logs if
it colludes with IdPs and/or SPs). We argue that this is a realistic assumption of
an ARM as its business model relies on its good reputation, however, it does not
mean that the ARM cannot be opportunistic when its malicious actions cannot
be detected or traced.
3 Preliminary
ma,mb...mj are plain text data items. Cipher(Encscheme,mi, L,Kipub−scheme)
is an encryption of a data item mi using the Encscheme encryption scheme
under i’s public encryption key and under the label L (such as a condition
string). The plain text mi can only be recovered by i who has the correspond-
ing private key Kipriv−scheme) as input to decryption algorithm. A signature
S(mi,Kisign) over a message mi can only be produced using i’s private signing
key Kisign. Anybody can verify the signature using the public verification key of
i: V erifySign((S(mi,Kisign)),K
i
verify) = 1 (valid) or 0 (invalid).
A commitment cmi of a data item mi is generated using a Commit algo-
rithm, along with a random value r: cmi = Commit(mi, r). A commitment is
hiding : it does not show any computational information on mi, and binding : it
is computationally impossible to find another m
′
i and r
′
as inputs to the same
Commit algorithm that gives a value c′mi = cmi .
PK{(ma): F (ma,mb...mi) = 1} refers to a zero knowledge proof interactive
protocol (PK). PK is executed between a Prover and a Verifier. The data to the
left of the colon ma is the data item that a Prover needs to prove the knowledge
of such that the statements on the right side of the colon, F (ma,mb...mi) = 1, is
correct. A verifier will not learn the data on the left hand side of the colon, while
other parameters are known. The actual protocol involves one or more message
exchange(s). At the end of PK, the Verifier will be convinced (or not) that the
Prover has the knowledge of ma without the Verifier learning it.
The anonymous credential system (ACS) [1, 13] is built upon a com-
bination of signature schemes [14, 15], verifiable encryption (VE) scheme [16]
and commitment schemes. ACS provides many privacy-enhancing services, how-
ever, in this paper, only the CRPI capability is elaborated. In ACS, unlike
the ‘usual’ certificate (such as X509 certificate), a certificate Cert1 issued to
a user ua is a signature of certificate issuer CertIssuer1 over a collection of PII:
Cert1 = S(ida,mb, ...mi;KCertIssuer1sign ). A user ua should keep Cert1 private.
We assume that the data item ida in Cert1 is the explicit identity of ua,
while mb, ...mi contain other PII (such as address, date of birth, etc). The
CRPI is accomplished as follows: ida is blinded using a commitment scheme:
cida = Commit(ida, r). Then, the value ida, hidden in cida , is encrypted using
the VE scheme [16] under the ARM public encryption key, and under a set of
Conditions: Cipher(EncV E , ida, Conditions,KARMpublic−V E). Then, a PK is exe-
cuted to prove that cida is the commitment for ida contained in Cert1 issued by
CertIssuer1. This PK also proves that CipherV E−ida is an encryption of ida
hidden in cida , under the ARM public key:
PK{(Cert1, ida) : cida = Commit(ida, r)
∧ V erifySign(S(ida, ..,mi;KCertIssuer1sign ),KCertIssuer1verify ) = 1
∧ Cipher(EncV E , ida, Conditions,KARMpublic−V E)} (1)
In an identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBEPRE) scheme - such
as [7, 8], a public key is just a label, known as id. We denote an IBEPRE
of a message ma under a label id1 as Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,ma, id1). To de-
crypt, the private key skid1 has to be extracted from a private key generator
(PKG) (who has the master secret key msk). A re-encryption key rkid1→id2
(which can be generated if one knows skid1 , id1, and id2) is needed to re-
encrypt Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,ma, id1) into Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,ma, id2). The
entity performing such a re-encryption does not learn the value of ma.
To verify that a user is using a genuine trusted platform module (TPM)
in a privacy-preserving manner, a direct anonymout attestation (DAA) protocol
[17] is executed. A successful execution of the DAA protocol convinces a verifier
that it is interacting with a genuine TPM platform without learning the ‘identity’
of the platform. Instead, a pair of per-session attestation identity key (AIK) is
generated which can be used by the TPM as its authenticated signing key to
sign TPM-generated messages - such as a platform configuration register (PCR)
value - for that session only (a PCR value is the hash value of the modules
loaded in a secure execution area of a TPM). Therefore, interactions with the
same TPM over multiple sessions are unlinkable - thus privacy preserving.
The provable isolated execution property provided by an extended TPM
platform allows one to prove that a given output is the result of a correct exe-
cution of a set of integrity-protected modules based on some known input. The
generation of such proofs only require a simple signature of the TPM PCR value,
input, output, and other supporting parameters. Readers who are interested in
the details should consult the referenced paper [5].
4 The PIEMCP
In this section, we detail the PIEMCP which combines the ACS with an IBEPRE
scheme, using the extended TPM technology which provides the provable isolated
execution property. Our PIEMCP is designed such that any IBEPRE schemes
respecting the definition provided in [8] can be used.
We divide PIEMCP into several stages: the setup, PII escrow (PE) stage, key
escrow (KE) stage, multiple conditions binding (MC) stage, and the revocation
stage. The setup is performed once. The PE and KE stages have to be performed
once per session. The MC stage can be performed multiple times in a session
as needed. The revocation stage is executed when an SP believes that some
conditions are satisfied, thus needing the PII to be revealed. We assume that the
semi-honest ARM also performs the role of a PKG.
Assume we need to escrow d-number of PII. In PIEMCP, instead of encrypt-
ing the PII for the ARM as is currently performed in the ACS, we use a one-time
user-generated keys for the VE cheme [16]. The encryptions of the d PII are given
to a IdP for escrow. Then, the private portion of the VE one-time key is escrowed
as follows: the user’s extended TPM platform will perform a provable isolated
execution of Module1 - given the public key portion of the generated one-time
VE keys, it performs an IBEPRE of the corresponding VE one-time private key
under a condition string Conditions - see Table 2. Then, the encrypted key is
sent to the ARM for escrow, along with the proof to show that the ciphertext
is the result of a correct execution of Module1. When the escrowed PII needs
to be bound to a different Conditions2, the IdP will request the ARM to per-
form an IBEPRE of the IBEPRE-encrypted VE private key generated earlier,
but this time under Conditiosn2. When a particular set of Conditions − X is
satisfied, an SP will request the ARM to extract the IBEPRE private key for
Conditions−X. Figure 1) shows the message flow of the PIEMCP.
Fig. 1. The PIEMCP message flow
Input Kupub−V E , Conditions,
params-IBEPRE
Process P1.1. Retrieve Kupriv−V E
P1.2. Verify that Kupriv−V E is
the correct private key for
the input value Kupub−V E
P1.3. If P1.2 returns true,
generate
Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,K
u
priv−V E ,
Conditions− SP1).
Otherwise, return an error
Output CipherConditionsIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
or error
Fig. 2. Module1 -IBEPRE encryption of
VE private key
Setup: a user ua obtains a certificate Cert containing PII ida...mi from a
certificate issuer CertIssuer. The PII certified by CertIssuer is accepted by the
IdPs and SPs in the federation. To verify the issued certificate, the CertIssuer’s
signature verification key KCertIssuerverify is used.
PII escrow (PE): a federated single sign-on (FSSO) session starts when ua needs
to access services from a service provider SP1 who in turn requires the IdP to
escrow some of ua’s PII under a set of conditions Conditions-SP1 which can be
freshly negotiated per session, or pre-agreed beforehand. A user is responsible
to verify that the agreed conditions are formed as follows:
Conditions = KSPenc + one-time random + list-of-conditions
whereby KSPend refers to the public encryption key of the SP to whom the con-
ditions apply, one-time random refers to a unique one-time random value that
identifies that particular session between the user and SP, list-of-conditions
refer to the set of of conditions that must be satisfied before the associated en-
crypted message can be recovered.
A start of a session triggers the start of the PE stage. While the existing
ACS [1] binds the conditions to the encryptions of those PII directly, in PIEMCP,
such binding only occurs during the KE stage. At the PE stage, we use a generic
condition string stating that ‘decryption of these PII should only be performed
pending a successful recovery of the associated decryption key that is escrowed
in the following key-escrow stage’. We denote this condition as GenCond. The
IdP will not be able to decrypt these escrowed PII because it does not have the
decryption key.
1. SP1 generates a signed request for PII ma...mc to be escrowed to the IdP.
This request message includes the Conditions-SP1. This request message is
redirected through ua to the IdP.
2. The IdP verifies the request from SP1. If valid, it will contact the user to
start the PII escrow operation.
3. User ua generates one-time VE encryption key pair (Kupub−V E , K
u
priv−V E),
the commitments ca...cc for PII ma...mc respectively, and three VE cipher-
text of PII ma...mc (denoted as Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,
Kupub−V E) for simplicity).
4. ua sends Kupub−V E , and Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,K
u
pub−V E)
to the IdP
5. ua and IdP engage in a PK to prove that the commitments ca...cc hide
PII ma...mc which have been certified in Cert issued by CertIssuer. This
PK also proves that the VE ciphertexts given correctly encryption ma...mc
w.r.t Kupub−V E . The value of ca...cc are given to the IdP as part of the PK
procedure.
6. After a successful execution of the above PK, the IdP generates a pseudonym
to identify the user for this session and associates it withKupub−V E , Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,K
u
pub−V E),
Kupub−V E , and
Conditions-SP1.
We cannot simply substitute the execution of the above PK protocol with
the use of an extended TPM platform. This is because at this stage, the IdP
does not have any data that can be used as a source of a valid input to a TPM
module (garbage-in garbage-out problem). In our protocol, since it is the user
who generates and givesKupub−V E to the IdP, the IdP has to verify that the given
Kupub−V E is correct in relation to the encrypted PII - which has been achieved
by the execution of the PK protocol. Only from this point onwards can we
use Kupub−V E and other publicly known value as valid input to a module to be
executed by an extended TPM platform.
Key escrow (KE): The public key parameters for the IBEPRE scheme used are
known to all participants.
1. The IdP signs Conditions-SP1 and sends S(Conditions − SP1,KIdPsign +
Conditions-SP1 in a redirection message through the user to the ARM.
2. The ARM verifies the signature. If valid, it stores Conditions-SP1 and con-
tinues. Otherwise, halt.
3. ua and ARM engage in a DAA protocol to verify the use of valid TPM
platform and to generate a pair of AIK keys, denoted as KTPM−uaverify−AIK ,
KTPM−uasign−AIK .
4. As AIK should only be used to sign messages generated internally by a TPM,
ua’s TPM should also generate a one-time signing key to sign messages from
ua (but not TPM-internally generated messages): Kuaverify, K
ua
sign. The user’s
TPM can send Kuaverify + S(K
ua
verify,K
TPM−ua
sign−AIK to the ARM for verification.
5. ua runs Module1 on the extended TPM platform to perform an IBEPRE
encryption of Kupriv−V E under Conditions-SP1 - see Table 2. This module
will generate an output: Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions−SP1)
6. The platform should generate the proof of correct execution of Module1.
This proof would contain information on the extended TPM ’s PCR values
(before and after execution) calculated from the value of Module1, the in-
puts, output, and other necessary information. This proof is signed using
KTPM−uasign−AIK . See [5] for details of how such proof is generated.
7. The TPM proof + Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions − SP1) are
sent to the ARM.
8. The ARM verifies the TPM proof. If valid, the ARM stores Conditions-SP1
+ Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions − SP1), and sends a signed
CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Kupriv−V E to the IdP.
9. The IdP verifies the received message from the ARM. If valid, it generates a
one-time pseudonym pseudoa to identify the user for that particular session
only.
10. The IdP stores pseudoa, and links it with Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,
Kupriv−V E , Conditions− SP1), Kupub−V E , Conditions-SP1, and
Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,Kupub−V E).
11. The IdP then sends a signed response message back to SP1. Included in the
response are pseudoa, Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions − SP1),
Conditions-SP1, and Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,Kupub−V E).
12. SP1 verifies the response message from the IdP. If valid, SP1 now has the
necessary data such that when Conditions-SP1 are satisfied, ma...mc can be
recovered with the help of the ARM.
Multiple Conditions Binding (MC): This stage is started when ua goes to an-
other SP2 who also needs the escrowed PII but this time bound to a different
set of conditions Conditions.
1. SP2 generates a signed request for ua’s escrowed PIIma...mc to be bound to
Conditions-SP2. This request message include the standard request message
dictated according to the respective FSSO protocol used in the federation,
as well as Conditions-SP2.
2. The IdP verifies the request from SP2. From this request, the IdP will
also detect that it has an open authenticated session with a user known
as pseudoa.1.
3. The IdP retrieves Conditions-SP1 associated with pseudoa, and sends a
signed re-encryption request to the ARM by sending Conditions-SP1 and
Conditions-SP2’.
4. The ARM verifies the request, and checks if it has the same Conditions-SP1.
If not, stops.
5. To verify that the IdP has not given an invalid Conditions-SP2’ to the ARM,
the ARM prepares a messagemultiple-bind = Conditions-SP1 + Conditions-
SP2’, and generates a signature over multiple-bind.
6. The ARM sends S(multiple− bind,KARMsign ) to ua.
7. ua, who knows Conditions-SP1 and Conditions-SP2 verifies the multiple-
bind message and its signature. If valid, ua sends a signed ‘OK’ message
using Kuaverify to the ARM.
8. The ARM verifies the response from the user. If it is valid, it then retrieves
Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions − SP1), and re-encrypts it un-
der Conditions-SP2 to generate Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions−
SP2) (the ARM can do the re-encryption as it knows
Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions − SP1), msk, Conditions-SP1,
and Conditions-SP2 ).
9. The ARM stores Conditions-SP2 and Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E ,
Conditions− SP2), and sends a signed re-encrypted ciphertext to the IdP.
10. The IdP verifies the ARM reply. If valid, it then sends a signed response
message back to SP2. Included in the response are pseudoa,
Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions− SP2), Conditions-SP2, and
Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,Kupub−V E).
11. SP2 verifies the response returned from the IdP. If valid, then SP2 knows
that ma...mc can be recovered with the help of the ARM when Conditions-
SP2 are satisfied.
Revocation When an SP, say SP1, believes that Conditions-SP1 are satisfied,
it will start the revocation stage:
1. SP1 sends a signed revocation request containing Conditions-SP1 to the
ARM.
2. The ARM verifies the request message and checks if it has the same Conditions-
SP1’ stored. If so, it checks if the SP it is talking to is the same as the identity
of SP1′ as stated in Conditions− SP1′.
3. The ARM verifies if Conditions-SP1’ are satisfied. If not, stops.
4. If satisfied, then the ARM extracts skConditions−SP1 which is the private key
for Conditions-SP1.
1 The IdP can detect such an open authenticated session with pseudoa because in the
existing FSSO protocols, the request message that SP2 generated earlier is actually
sent through a redirection from the user to the IdP, thus some authenticated session
information (such as cookies) can be passed along to the IdP from the user machine
5. ARM generates a message rev = skConditions−SP1 + Conditions − SP1. It
then signs rev and encrypts it using the public encryption key as stated in
Conditions− SP1 string for SP1 (any secure encryption algorithm can be
used here).
6. SP1 decrypts and verifies the ARM response, obtains skConditions−SP1, and
then decrypts Cipher(EncIBEPRE ,Kupriv−V E , Conditions−SP1) to recover
Kupriv−V E . Next, it uses K
u
priv−V E to decrypt
Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,Kupub−V E) to reveal ma,mb,mc.
5 Formal Security Analysis with CPN
The PIEMCP involves large multi-party communication, employs complex cryp-
tographic primitives, and uses the extended TPM functionalities. These factors,
combined with the numerous message exchanges between users, IdPs, SPs, and
ARM in a multi-stages execution, make the PIEMCP a complex system. In order
to verify, with high assurance, the achievement of the security properties of a
complex system such as PIEMCP, a formal approach is required.
We use the colour petri net (CPN) and state space analysis as the formal
method techniques to model the PIEMCP and to verify its security properties as
detailed in Section 2. The use of CPN as the formal method technique to model
and verify large complex systems is well-known [18–21].
We have formally modeled the PIEMCP using the CPNs technique. From the
CPN model, a state space is generated. A state space contains the information
of all the possible states of the protocol. We can query this information to verify
the security properties of PIEMCP (see Section 2). Specifically, we translate
the security properties into a series of queries statements which can be verified
against the information contained in the space space.
A background of CPN is provided before the model is described in details.
5.1 CPN Preliminary
A CPN consists of two types of nodes, places (drawn as ellipses) and transitions
(rectangles), and directed edges known as arcs. A place is typed by a color set
and contains collections (multi-sets) of data items called tokens of the same type
as the place. A transition represents an event and may have a guard associated
with it. The guard is a boolean expression enclosed in square brackets. Arcs
connect places to transitions and transitions to places, and are inscribed by
expressions comprising variables, constants and functions. Variables are typed
and can be assigned values known as binding.
A transition’s input places have arcs going to the transition, while its out-
put places have arcs coming from the transition. A transition is enabled if: 1)
sufficient tokens exist in each input place to match each respective input arc
inscription when evaluated for a particular binding of its variables, and 2) the
transition guard evaluates to true for the same binding. If a transition is enabled,
it can occur (or be fired). The occurrence of a transition removes tokens spec-
ified by the respective arc inscriptions from input places, and deposits tokens
specified by inscriptions on the output arcs into output places. The state of a
CPN is called a marking. It consists of tokens distributed on each place of the
CPN. Occurrence of transitions represent stage changes.
The hierarchical features of CPNs facilitate the constructions of large models
by using a number of CPN modules called pages. Each page is linked to a substi-
tution transition (sub-transition) at a higher level of the model. By means of the
hierarchical structuring mechanism it is possible to capture different abstraction
levels of the modeled system in the same CPN model.
5.2 Model Description
The PIEMCP model consists of one main protocol page, with 4-subpages, each
representing the four main stages of the protocol: the PE, KE, MC, and revo-
cation stage. Each PE page in both variants has one helper sub-page. For each
model, we parameterize the number of repeatable session (including the PE,KE,
and MC stage) to be executed. Similarly, the attack model for each variant of
the protocol is also parameterized.
Cryptographic Data CPN Colour
VE ciphertext of PII CIPHER VE PII
VE Public / Private key K PUB VE/K PRIV VE
UCHVE cihpertext of K PRIV VE (representing all the CIPHER UCHVE KVE
n ciphertext pieces as a whole)
UCHVE ciphertext of K PRIV VE (representing an individual CIPHER UCHVE KVE PIECE
K PRIV VE ciphertext piece).
IBEPRE of K PRIV VE CIPHER IBEPRE KVE
Table 1. Mapping between cryptographic data to CPN colours
Several main CPN colour definitions have been provided in Table 2. Table 1
shows the mapping between the cryptographic data to CPN colour set used.
Main page Figure 3 shows the main page for the PIEMCP protocol. As
described earlier, the protocol starts with a user and a service provider SP1
agreeing on a set of conditions (represented by the transition U SP1 GENERATE
CONDITIONS) then proceed to execute the PE stage (captured in the subtransition
PII Escrow), followed by the KE stage (represented by another subtransition
Key Escrow). Upon completion of the KE stage, the user goes to another service
provider SP2 and they both then agree on another set of conditions (represented
by the transition U SP2 GENERATE CONDITIONS) before starting the MC stage
(represented by a subtransition Multiple Conditions).
The completion of the MC stage marks the completion of one session. At the
end of a session, we store the session data accumulated by all entities. How many
1 colset SP_REQ = record genCond:STRING * conditions1:STRING *
2 <other fields omitted for simplicity>
3 colset SP_REQ_SIG = record message:SP_REQ * key:K_SIGN_GEN;
4 colset SIGNED_SP_REQ = record message:SP_REQ * signat:SP_REQ_SIG;
5 colset K_PUB_VE = INT;
6 colset K_PRIV_VE = INT;
7 colset K_SIGN_GEN = INT;
8 colset PII = STRING;
9 colset LABEL = STRING;
10 colset PROVABILITY = BOOL;
11 colset COMMITMENT_PII = record message:PII * random:RANDOM;
12 colset SIGNATURE_GEN = record message:MSG * key:K_SIGN_GEN *
13 provable: PROVABILITY;
14 colset SIGNED_MSG = record message:MSG * signat:SIGNATURE_GEN;
15 colset CIPHER_VE_PII = record message:PII * key:K_PUB_VE * label:LABEL *
16 provable:PROVABILITY;
17 colset CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE = record message:K_PRIV_VE*
18 groupKeys:K_PUB_UCHVE_LIST* desigMembers:DESIG_MEMBERS_LIST *
19 k:THRESHOLD *n:INT * t:INT * label:LABEL * provable:BOOL;
20 colset CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE_PIECE = record message:K_PRIV_VE *
21 key:K_PUB_UCHVE * label:LABEL * isDesignated:BOOL;
22 colset SP_RESPONSE = record pseudo:STRING * cipherVE:CIPHER_VE_PII *
23 cipherUCHVE:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE;
24 colset SP_RESPONSE_SIG = record message:SP_RESPONSE * key:K_SIGN_GEN *
25 provable:BOOL;
26 colset SIGNED_SP_RESPONSE= record message:SP_RESPONSE *
27 signat:SP_RESPONSE_SIG;
28 colset DEC_REQ = record conditions:LABEL *
29 uchvePiece:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE_PIECE;
30 colset DEC_REQ_SIGNATURE = record message:DEC_REQ *
31 key:K_SIGN_GEN * provable:BOOL;
32 colset SIGNED_DEC_REQ = record message:DEC_REQ * signat:DEC_REQ_SIGNATURE;
33 ........
34
35 Parameters:
36 val USER_ATTACK2 = false;
37 val SP_ATTACK5 = false;
38 val session=2;
39 ....
Table 2. Colour Definition for PIEMCP
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if counter>session then 1`true else empty
SP1 REVOCATION CONDITIONS
FULFILLED
input();
output ();
action
let
val condRandom = getRandom()
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
val condSP2 = "Conditions SP2"^condRandom
val conditions = #conditions(userRec)
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_conditions2 conditions condSP2
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_conditions userRec conditions
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp2.txt")
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_conditions spRec condSP2
in
 updateSPRecord("sp2.txt", spRec)
end;
input ();
output ();
action
let
val _ = resetARMRecord("arm.txt")
val _ = resetUserRecord("user.txt")
val _ = resetSP1Record("sp1.txt")
val _ = resetSP2Record("sp2.txt")
val _ = resetIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val condRandom = getRandom()
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
val condSP1 = "Conditions SP1"^condRandom
val genCond = "GenCond"^getRandom()
val conditions = #conditions(userRec)
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_conditions1 conditions condSP1
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_genCond conditions genCond
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_conditions userRec conditions
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_genCond spRec genCond
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_conditions spRec condSP1
in
 updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
end;
input (counter);
output ();
action
let 
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.tx ")
 val armRec = readARMRecord("arm.txt")
 val sp1Rec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 val sp2Rec = readSPRecord("sp2.txt")
 val _ = updateUserRecord("user_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", userRec)
 val _ = updateIDPRecord("idp_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", idpRec)
 val _ = updateArmRecord("arm_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", armRec)
 val _ = updateSPRecord("sp1_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1 ^".txt", sp1Rec)
in
 updateSPRecord("sp2_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", sp2Rec)
end;
PII
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PE
true
1 1`1
1
1`true
Fig. 3. Main PIEMCP page for both variants
session that the user executes is parameterized by the value of session. As long
as the value of the variable counter is less than or equal to session (note the
guard function of the transition U SP1 GENERATE CONDITIONS), the model will
execute another session. Otherwise, the guard function will disable the transi-
tion, instead, a token will be placed at the place SP1 REVOCATION CONDITIONS
FULFILLED (note the arc inscription from the transition STORE SESSION DATA
to the mentioned place) which triggers the start of a revocation stage. The end
result of the revocation stage is the success or failure of the revelation of the
user’s PII as represented by the existence (or non-existence) token in the place
RECOVERED USER PII.
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input (escrowReqSig);
output ();
action
let
 val genCond = #genCond(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val conditions1 = #conditions1(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val idpCons = #idpConditions(idpRec)
 val idpCons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_genCond idpCons genCond
 val idpCons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_conditions1 idpCons conditions1
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_idpConditions idpRec idpCons
 val uchveCipher = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec)
 val groupKeys = #uchvePubKeys(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_groupKeys uchveCipher groupKeys
 val k = #k(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val t = #t(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val n = #n(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_k uchveCipher k
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_t uchveCipher t
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_n uchveCipher n
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_cipherUCHVE1 idpRec uchveCipher
in
 updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
end;
input (escrowReqSig);
output ();
action
let 
val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 
in 
updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
end;
input ();
output (signedPseudo);
action
let
 val idpRec = readIDPRecor ("idp.txt")
 val pseudo = "pseudo"^getRandom();
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_pseudo idpRec pseudo
 
val signKey = #signKey(idpRec)
 val pseudoSig  if not IDP_ATTACK4 the  sign(pseudo, signKey) else sign(pseudo, 999)
 val signedPs udo = {message=pseudo, 
signat=pseudoSig}
 
val idpRec = updateIDPR cord("idp.txt", idpRec)
in
 signedPseudo
end;
if not SP_ATTACK5 then 1`{message=sp1Req, 
signat={message=sp1Req,
key=(#signKey(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
provable=false}} else
1`{message=sp1Req, 
signat={message=sp1Req,
key=999, provable=false}}
input (signedPseudo);
output ();
action
let
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val pseudo = #message(signedPseudo)
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_pseudo userRec pseudo
in
 updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
end;
input (idpGenCond, idpVeCipher, idpVeKey, userVeKey);
output ();
action
let 
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val cons = #idpConditions(idpRec)
 val cons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_genCond cons idpGenCond
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_idpConditions idpRec cons
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_vePubKey idpRec idpVeKey
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_cipherVE idpRec idpVeCipher
 val idpRec = updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_veKeys userRec userVeKey
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
in 
idpRec
end;
[(#message(escrowReqSig)) = 
(#message(#signat(escrowReqSig)))
andalso
(#key(#signat(escrowReqSig))) = 
(#sp1VerifyKey(#verifyKeys(
 readIDPRecord("idp.txt"))))]
[verify(signedPseudo,
(#idpVerifyKey(
#verifyKeys(
readUserRecord("user.txt")))))]
if SP_ATTACK1 then 
{genCond="EasyGenCond", 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))} else
if SP_ATTACK11 then
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1="EasyToFulfillConditions",
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))} else
if SP_ATTACK12 then
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=[7,8,9],
k=1, t=1, n=3} else
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))}
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if #provable(idpVeCipher) andalso
#provable(cert) andalso
#signKey(cert) = #certVerifyKey(
 #verifyKeys(readIDPRecord("idp.txt"))) andalso
#message(idpCommitment) = #pii(cert) andalso
#message(idpVeCipher) = #message(idpCommitment) andalso
#message(idpVeCipher) = #pii(cert) andalso
idpVeKey = #key(idpVeCipher) andalso
idpGenCond = #label(idpVeCipher) then 1`true
else 1`false
if not USER_ATTACK2 then 
#pub(userVeKey) else
0
SERVICE PROVIDER 1- SP1 IDENTITY PROVIDER - IDP USER
1
1`{pii="m_a",signKey=501,provable=
true}
Fig. 4. PE page
PE page This page represents the PE stag for he PIEMCP (see Figure 5.2).
Step 1 of PE stage is r presented by the place SP1 PII REQ SIGNATURE, which
is of type SIGNED SP REQ. From Table 2, this message represents a cryptograph-
ically signed mess by SP1 an the main content of the message is the condi-
tio s Cond1 under which th us r’s PII c n be revealed. There are other values
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Fig. 5. Cryptographic One-time Data Generation
included in this message, however, they are omitted for simplicity. the signed
message is sent to the IdP.
Step 2 is represented by the transition IDP VERIFIES SP1 REQ AND STARTS
PII ESCROW whereby it first verifies the signature validity. If it is valid, it con-
tacts the user to starts the escrow operation. Step 3 is captured by the sub-
transition page GENERATE ONE TIME DATA. The output of this sub-transition is
the commitment of the PII, the one-time VE public and private keys, and the
VE ciphertexts of the PII.
Step 4 is represented by the transition U SENDS PII ESCROW DATA. There are
three data being sent in this message: the commitment (a type of cryptographic
data) of the user PII (represented by the place IDP RECV PII COMMIT), the user-
generated one-time VE public key (represented by the place IDP RECV ONE TIME
VE PUB KEY, and the ciphertext of the user’s PII (represented by the place IDP
RECV PII VE CIPHER).
Step 5 involves the execution of a PK operation. This is represented by the
transition IDP U PK PII VE CIPHER). The output of this transition is a boolean
value representing the result of executing the PK operation: if it is true, then
the IdP is convinced that the given ciphertext correctly encrypts the user’s PII
under the given conditions and public key.
Step 6 will only be executed if the PK operation returns a true. If so, the
pseudonym generation is captured by the transition IDP GENERATES STORES
PSEUDONYM AND SEND TO USER.
Fig. 6. KE page
KE Page Figure 5.2 shows the KE page model. Step 1 is represented by the
transition IDP SENDS SIGNED SP1 COND. Step 2 is represented by the transition
ARM VERIFIES AND CONTACTS USER START DAA. Step 3 and 4 of the protocol
are represented by the transitions TPM GENERATES AIK KEY SIGNED SESSION
KEY AND DAA PROOFS and ARM VERIFIES STORES AIK PUB KEY SESSION KEY.
We do not model the details of a DAA protocol as we are only concerned with
the output of such a protocol: convincing the IdP that the user is using a valid
TPM module without learning the permanent identity of the TPM device itself.
Instead, a two sets of signing and verification keys representing the TPM device
are produced: a set of AIK keys (used to sign messages generated from within
the TPM device), and a set of session keys (to sign other messages). These two
sets of keys are used throughout the PIEMCP protocol.
After establishing the use of correct TPM device, he user’s TPM starts the
execution of Module1 to produce a IBEPRE of K PRIV VE (represented by the
transition TPM EXECUTES MODULE 1 - step 5. After the execution of Module1,
the user’s TPM device generates a proof of correct execution (represented by the
transition TPM GENERATES CORRECT EXECUTION PROOF - step 6) which is signed
using the TPM AIK key. Step 7, the sending of the IBEPRE of VE private key
and its corresponding TPM correct execution is captured by the transition U
SENDS ARM MODULE 1 RESULT AND TPM PROOF.
Upon receiving the message, the ARM verifies the given encryption and the
proof (represented by the transition ARM VERIFIES MODULE 1 TPM PROOF - step
8). If it succeeds, it then prepares and sends a response message to the IdP (rep-
resented by the transition ARM SENDS SIGNED CIPHER IBEPRE KVE TO IDP).
Step 9 and 10 are represented by the transition IDP VERIFIES IBEPRE KVE.
IdP then prepares a response message to the SP1 (step 11) represented by the
transition IDP PREPARES RESPONSE TO SP1 and IDP SEND RESPONSE TO SP1.
Upon receiving the message, the SP1 then verifies the response from the IdP
(step 12) represented by the transition SP1 VERIFIES AND STORES RESPONSE.
MC page For completion, the MC page for the PIEMCP is provided in Figure
7.
Fig. 7. MC page
Step 1 is represented by the transition SP2 REDIRECTS COND BIND REQ TO
IDP THROUGH USER whereby SP2 sends a request message to the IdP. Step 2 is
represented by the transition IDP CHECKS OPEN SESSION WITH USER. Step 3 is
represented by two transitions: IDP RETRIEVES AND SIGNS COND SP1 AND SP2
and IDP SENDS PRE REQ TO ARM. Step 4 and 5 are represented by the transition
ARM VERIFIES PRE REQUEST AND SIGNS MULTI BIND. Step 6 is represented by
the transition ARM SENDS MULTIPLE BIND TO USER, followed by the verification
of the correct conditions by the user through the transition U VERIFIES AND
RESPONDS MULTIPLE BIND MESSAGE RESULT - step 7. The ARM then performs
the re-encryption (step 8) represented by the transition ARM REENCRYPTS KVE
AND SIGNS REENCRYPTED KVE and sends the re-encrypted key to the IdP (step
9) represented by teh transition ARM SENDS REENCRYPTED KVE. The IdP verifies
the response from the ARM, prepares and sends a response message to SP2 (step
10) represented by the transition IDP VERIFIES AND PREPARES SP RESPONSE.
Step 11 is where the SP2 verifies the IdP response which is captured by the
transition SP2 VERIFIES AND STORES RESPONSE.
Fig. 8. Revocation Page
Revocation page Figure 8 shows the model for the Revocation stage. The
revocation stage starts when one of the service providers (in this case SP1)
discovers that some conditions are satisfied. Step 1 of this stage is represented
by the transition SP1 SIGNS FULFILLED CONDITIONS and SP1 SENDS REVOKE
REQUEST. Upon receiving the request, the ARM verifies the request message and
perform several checks. The check performed in step 2 is represented by the
transition ARM VERIFIES REVOKE REQUEST, while the check performed in step 3
is represneted by the transition ARM CHECKS CONDITIONS FULFILLMENT. Step 4
is represented by teh transition ARM EXTRACTS IBE KEY. Step 5 is represented
by the transition ENCRYPT DEC KEY and ARM SENDS SIGNED DECRYPTION KEY
TO SP1 whereby the ARM signs and encrypts the secret key (SK) extracted and
sends it to SP1. Step 6 is represented by the transition SP1 DEC AND VERIFIES
SK and SP1 RECOVERS USER PII whereby SP1 decrypts the encrypted SK, ver-
ifies the ARM signature, and recover the VE private key to eventually recover
the PII.
5.3 Attack scenarios
In verifying the security properties of the PIEMCP, we have incorporated the
following malicious behaviours into the CPN model in accordance with the threat
model detailed in Section 2.
1. A malicious user can perform the following actions:
(a) provides incorrect PII and incorrect one-time VE public key to the IdP
during the PE stage,
(b) provides incorrect Moduel1 result during the KE stage,
(c) uses hard to fulfill ConditionsX ′ (which are different from the originally
agreed conditions with the an SPx) as input to Module1 (the IBEPRE
of the VE private key).
2. Both malicious IdPs and SPs can perform the following actions:
(a) gives an easy-to-fulfill conditions ConditionsX ′ to the ARM (which are
different from those originally agreed between a user and an SPx) during
the KE stage and MC stage,
(b) attempts to start the revocation stage using some conditions which are
not yet fulfilled,
(c) attempts to start the revocation stage using incorrect (non-existent)
easy-to-fulfill conditions,
(d) attempts to fool users to use same conditions string with two or more
SPs,
(e) attempts to learn the revealed PII which is intended for another SP.
3. An opportunistic but risk-averse ARM may attempt to recover the user PII
when it is trivial to do so. Specifically, if an ARM manage to obtain enough
data to decrypt Cipher(EncV E , (ma,mb,mc), GenCond,Kupub−V E) without
having to deliberately collude with other entities, it will do so.
We propose the parameterization approach to modeling attacks such that
one or more attacks can be switched on or off depending on the environmental
assumptions. There are numerous types of attacks that could be used to attack a
protocol. Creating a new model to capture each types of attack (existing or new)
is tedious and is not scalable as the number of attack grows. Parameterization
allows the re-use of the existing model and still make it behave differently ac-
cording to the attacks being set - virtually allowing thousands of possible attack
combinations to be captured.
The attack parameters can be encoded in the arc-inscriptions, transition
guards, or transition code-regions as if-statements. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that we do not have to change the model (adding new transitions,
places, arcs, or deleting existing ones) at all to obtain different behaviours.
5.4 Verification results
We verify the achievement of the PIEMCP security properties with and without
the existence of the attack scenarios described earlier. This two-stage approach
allows us to be confident that the protocol does provide the security properties
in a normal environment and in an environment under attack. Again, due to
space limitation, exhaustive explanation of the state space analysis that we have
conducted is not possible. Readers who are interested in the detail of our analysis
should refer to the cited reference [].
In summary, our state space analysis confirms that in the absence and pres-
ence of the attack scenarios detailed earlier, the PIEMCP achieves the multiple
conditions, accountable PII disclosure, authenticated PII, enforceable conditions
fulfillment, conditions-abuse resistant, and session unlinkability properties as
long as the implicit assumptions encoded into the model holds (the TPM prov-
able execution technology and the cryptographic primitives employed behave as
they are expected to).
The details of our analysis is as follows:
Multiple Conditions
Property 1 (Multiple Conditions). At the end of every escrow session, the PII
escrowed must be bound to multiple sets of alternative conditions, each to be
used with a different SP.
To verify this property, we need to verify that the UCHVE ciphertexts produced
at the KE and MC stages encrypt the same message (the VE public key) but
under different conditions. Therefore, in the absence of attacks, this property
can be verified by doing a simple session-data analysis as shown in Figure 9.
1 val os = TextIO.openOut ("multipleCond.txt");
2
3 TextIO.output (os, "Now checking the content of the IBEPRE encryptions.\n");
4 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
5 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
6 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
7 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
8 val cipherPRE11 = #cipherPRE(sp1Rec1)
9 val cipherPRE21 = #cipherPRE(sp2Rec1)
10 val cipherPRE12 = #cipherPRE(sp1Rec2)
11 val cipherPRE22 = #cipherPRE(sp2Rec2)
12
13 val messageSame = #message(cipherPRE11) = #message(cipherPRE21) andalso
14 #message(cipherPRE12) = #message(cipherPRE22);
15 val differentCond = #key(cipherPRE11) <> #key(cipherPRE21) andalso
16 #key(cipherPRE12) <> #key(cipherPRE22);
17
18 val multipleConditions = messageSame andalso differentCond;
19
20 if multipleConditions then
21 TextIO.output (os, "The Multiple Conditions property is SATISFIED.\n") else
22 TextIO.output (os, "The Multiple Conditions property is NOT SATISFIED.\n");
Fig. 9. Queries to verify Multiple Conditions - no attack
However, when SP1 and SP2 collude and attempt to fool the user to ac-
cept the same condition string (captured in the attack parameter SP ATTACK7),
this property may be violated. Our initial verification shows that this property
does not hold when this attack parameter is switched on. We found that this
is due to a missing operation in the original protocol design which requires the
user to verify the one-time property of the condition string before being used.
A simple function to capture such a one-time condition string property verifica-
tion is therefore defined and added to the protocol design. With this function
included, such an attack is detected and the protocol stops (verified by check-
ing the protocol dead marking). Therefore, the multiple conditions property is
satisfied.
Accountable PII Disclosure
Property 2 (Accountable PII Disclosure). In a revocation stage, only the SP
as stated in the relevant condition string should learn the value of the PII, not
anybody else.
To verify this property when no attacks are considered, we need to verify that
the transition SP1 DEC AND VERIFIES SK is fired. Due to the guard function
which will only enable the transition when the decryption of the ARM extracted
secret key is successful, when it is fired, it means that the intended recipient of
the PII (in our model the SP1) has rightfully managed to decrypt the VE private
key (which is used subsequently to recover the PII). To confirm this property,
we also need to make sure that there is a marking where the place AUTHORIZED
VE PRIV KEY is populated (called M3) and from that marking, we can reach the
other marking (M4) where the user PII is eventually revealed. This is to show
that the PII is revealed as a result of correct and authorized recovery of the
VE private key. The state space analysis queries used to verify this property is
shown in Figure 10.
1 val check1 = not (TIsDead ([TI.REVOCATION’SP1_DEC_AND_VERIFIES_SK 1], 1));
2 val m3Nodes = SearchNodes(
3 EntireGraph,
4 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’AUTHORIZED_VE_PRIV_KEY 1 n) > 0,
5 NoLimit,
6 fn n => n,
7 [],
8 op :: );
9 val m3Mark = List.nth(m3Nodes, 0);
10 val m4Nodes = SearchNodes(
11 EntireGraph,
12 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
13 NoLimit,
14 fn n => n,
15 [],
16 op :: );
17 val m4Mark = List.nth(m4Nodes, 0);
18 val check2 = Reachable(m3Mark, m4Mark);
19 val accountableOK = check1 andalso check2
Fig. 10. Queries to verify Accountable PII Disclosure - no attack
There are two malicious behaviours that may compromise this property: when
an SP other than the authorized SP as stated in the condition string attempt to
learn the value of the PII, and when the ARM attempts to reveal the PII as long
as it is trivial. We capture both of these attacks in two parameters: SP ATTACK8
and ARM ATTACK1. Having switched on these parameters, we need to verify that
this property still holds by examining that there should not be any marking
where the place SP2 OBTAINS VE PRIV KEY UNAUTHORIZED or ARM GETS PII is
populated. The queries used to verify this property is shown in Figure 11. Based
1 SP_ATTACK8 and ARM_ATTACK1
2 val sp2Nodes = SearchNodes(
3 EntireGraph,
4 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’SP2_OBTAINS_VE_PRIV_KEY_UNAUTHORIZED 1 n) > 0,
5 NoLimit,
6 fn n => n,
7 [],
8 op :: );
9 val check1 = length sp2Nodes = 0
10 val armNodes = SearchNodes(
11 EntireGraph,
12 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’ARM_GETS_PII 1 n) > 0,
13 NoLimit,
14 fn n => n,
15 [],
16 op :: );
17 val check2 = length armNodes=0
18 val accountableOK = check1 andalso check2
Fig. 11. Queries to verify Accountable PII Disclosure with attacks
on the queries, we have confirmed that the Accountable PII Disclosure property
is satisfied.
Authenticated PII
Property 3 (Authenticated PII). Prior to conditions fulfillment, IdPs, SPs,
and referees must not learn the value of the user’s PII but at the same time
be convinced that its encryption is correct; when conditions are fulfilled, the
revealed PII must indeed be a correct certified PII
Without considering attacks, the first verification can simply be performed by
analysing session-data to make sure that the IdP, SP1, and SP2 only possess
the ciphertext forms of the VE private key and PII - not their plain-text form.
Recall that a message field in a record representing a ciphertext is treated as un-
readable. The second verification (after conditions fulfillment) can be performed
using a simple state-space analysis. The query used to verify this property is
shown in Figure 12. Our verification process confirms that this property is sat-
isfied when no attack is included in the model.
Next, we determine the attack scenarios that may violate this security be-
haviour. Several attack scenarios include user giving incorrect PII or VE public
key during the PE stage, or provide incorrect TPM result. These attacks are
captured as USER ATTACK1, USER ATTACK2, USER ATTACK3. If any of these at-
tacks are launched, we expect the protocol to stop prematurely. A simple dead
markings analysis confirm that the protocol indeed stops prematurely. Thus, the
Authenticated PII property is satisfied.
1 val os = TextIO.openOut ("authenticatedPII.txt");
2 TextIO.output (os, "Verifying the Zero-knowledge property.\n");
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val startRevokeMarkList = SearchNodes(
10 EntireGraph,
11 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REVOCATION_CONDITIONS_FULFILLED 1 n) > 0,
12 NoLimit,fn n => n,[],op :: );
13 val startRevokeMark = List.nth (startRevokeMarkList, 0)
14 val revealedMarks = SearchNodes(
15 EntireGraph,
16 fn n => length (Mark.PIEMC’RECEOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
17 length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
18 length (Mark.REVOCATION’VE_PRIV_KEY 1 n) > 0,
19 NoLimit,fn n => n,[],op :: );
20 val wrongMarks = SearchNodes(
21 revealedMarks,
22 fn n => not (Reachable (startRevokeMark, n)),
23 NoLimit,fn n =>n,[],op :: );
24 val noLearn = length wrongMarks = 0
25 val correctPII = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
26 #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
27 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
28 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec2)) ;
29 val correctPre = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherPRE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
30 #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherPRE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
31 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherPRE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
32 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherPRE(sp2Rec2));
33 if correctPII andalso correctPre then
34 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs have correct ciphertexts.\n\n") else
35 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs does not have correct ciphertexts.\n\n");
36 TextIO.output (os, "Find marking where user PII is revoked, and compare the revoked value.\n");
37 val revealedNode = SearchNodes(
38 EntireGraph,
39 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
40 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
41 val mark1 = List.nth(revealedNode, 0);
42 val correctRevealed = if length revealedNode>0 andalso
43 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark1, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1))
44 then true else false;
45 val failProofList = SearchNodes(
46 EntireGraph,
47 fn n => length (Mark.PE’PI_PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n) > 0 andalso
48 not (List.nth (Mark.PE’PI_PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n, 0)),
49 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
50 val proofSuccess = length failProofList=0;
51 if noLearn andalso correctPII andalso correctPre andalso correctRevealed andalso
52 proofSuccess then
53 TextIO.output (os, "The Authenticated PII property is SATISFIED.\n") else
54 TextIO.output (os, "The Authenticated PII property is NOT SATISFIED.\n");
55 TextIO.closeOut os;
Fig. 12. Queries to verify Authenticated PII - no attack
Enforceable Conditions
Property 4 (Enforceable Conditions). A user’s PII should never be revealed
before all designated referees agree that the cryptographically bound conditions
are satisfied.
To verify this property without attack model, we need to show that when condi-
tions are satisfied, the revocation stage is started. Consequently, there must be
markings where it is shown that ARM agrees that the conditions are fulfilled -
we call this set of markings M1. There must also be other markings that repre-
sent the revelation of the user’s PII - we call this set of markings M2. We require
that M2 must exist only if there is M1, and that M1 must happen before M2.
The queries used to verify this property is shown in Figure 13 The result of the
1 val os = TextIO.openOut("enforceabled.txt");
2 TextIO.output (os, "Check M1 marking:\n");
3 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
4 EntireGraph,
5 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’COND_FULFILLED 1 n) > 0,
6 NoLimit,
7 fn n => n,
8 [],
9 op :: );
10 val m1Len = length m1Nodes;
11 val m1 = if m1Len=1 then List.nth (m1Nodes, 0) else 999;
12 val m1Correct = if m1<>999 andalso
13 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’COND_FULFILLED 1 m1 , 0) then true else false;
14 if m1Correct then TextIO.output (os, "M1 is OK.\n\n") else
15 TextIO.output (os, "M1 is NOT OK.\n\n");
16
17 TextIO.output (os, "Check M2 marking:\n");
18 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
19 EntireGraph,
20 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
21 NoLimit,
22 fn n => n,
23 [],
24 op :: );
25 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
26 val m2 = if m2Len=1 then List.nth (m2Nodes, 0) else 999;
27 val m2Correct = if m2<>999 then true else false;
28 if m2Correct then TextIO.output (os, "M2 is OK.\n\n") else
29 TextIO.output (os, "M2 is NOT OK.\n\n");
30
31 val precedence = Reachable(m1,m2);
32
33 if m1Correct andalso m2Correct andalso precedence then
34 TextIO.output (os, "The Enforceable conditions property is SATISFIED.") else
35 TextIO.output (os, "The enforceable conditions property is NOT SATISFIED.");
Fig. 13. Queries to verify Enforceable Conditions - no attack
queries show that this property is satisfied in the absence of malicious behaviour.
There are several attack scenarios that may violate violate this property. SPs
or IdPs could attempt to start the revocation stage by using bogus conditions
which the ARM would most likely agree of their fulfillment but which are not
the correct conditions as originally agreed (SP ATTACK3). In this scenario, we
should still expect M1 marking, but M2 should not exist as attempts by desig-
nated referees to decrypt the ciphertext must fail. Using state space analysis, we
confirm that this property holds in the presence of SP ATTACK3. Alternatively,
SPs or IdPs could attempt to start a revocation stage by using a set of correct,
but unfulfilled, conditions (SP ATTACK4). In this case, we expect both M1 and
M2 to not exist. The queries used to verify this property in the presence of the
described attacks are provided in Figure 14 The result of the queries show that
1 val os = TextIO.openOut("enforceable_1.txt");
2 TextIO.output (os, "Check M1 marking:\n");
3 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
4 EntireGraph,
5 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’COND_FULFILLED 1 n) > 0,
6 NoLimit,
7 fn n => n,
8 [],
9 op :: );
10 val m1Len = length m1Nodes;
11 val m1Correct = if SP_ATTACK3 andalso m1Len = 0 then true else
12 if SP_ATTACK3 andalso m1Len>0 then false else
13 if SP_ATTACK4 andalso m1Len=1 andalso
14 not (List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’COND_FULFILLED 1 (List.nth(m1Nodes,0)) , 0)) then true else false;
15
16 if m1Correct then TextIO.output (os, "M1 is OK.\n\n") else
17 TextIO.output (os, "M1 is NOT OK.\n\n");
18
19 TextIO.output (os, "Check M2 marking:\n");
20 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
21 EntireGraph,
22 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
23 NoLimit,
24 fn n => n,
25 [],
26 op :: );
27 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
28 val m2Correct = if m2Len=0 then true else false;
29
30
31 if m1Correct andalso m2Correct then
32 TextIO.output (os, "The Enforceable conditions property is SATISFIED.") else
33 TextIO.output (os, "The enforceable conditions property is NOT SATISFIED.");
Fig. 14. Queries to verify Enforceable Conditions - with attacks
the enforceable conditions property is satisfied even in the absence of malicious
behaviours.
Conditions Abused Resistant
Property 5 (Conditions Abuse Resistant). An SP and an IdP must not be
able to fool the user to encrypt the PII, or the VE private key, under a set of
conditions different from those originally agreed. Similarly, an SP or IdP must
not be able to successfully revoke the user’s PII using conditions different from
those originally agreed.
In the absence of attack model, this property can be verified by showing that
the VE and UCHVE encryptions received by the IdP, SP1, and SP2 must be
encrypted under the same conditions label as those originally agreed between
the user, SP1, and SP2. A simple session-data analysis can be used to confirm
this property. The queries used to verify this property is shown in Figure 15
The result of the queries show that this property is satisfied in the absence of
1 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse1.txt")
2 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
3 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
4 val idpRec1= readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt")
5 val idpRec2= readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt")
6 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
7 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
8 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
9 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
10
11 val cond1_1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))
12 val cond2_1 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))
13 val cond1_2 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2))
14 val cond2_2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2))
15
16 val idpSP1CondOK = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond1_1 andalso
17 #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond1_2 andalso
18 #conditions(sp1Rec1) = cond1_1 andalso
19 #conditions(sp1Rec2) = cond1_2
20
21 val idpSP2CondOK =
22 cond2_1= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso cond2_2 = #conditions(sp2Rec2) andalso
23 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond2_1 andalso
24 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond2_2
Fig. 15. Queries to verify Condition Abused Resistant - no attack
malicious behaviour.
There are many attack scenarios that may violate this property: a user
can use incorrect impossible-to-satisfy conditions string as input to Module1
(USER ATTACK4), an SP could provide the IdP with incorrect easy-to-fulfill con-
ditions (in the hope that the user would use these incorrect conditions for
encryption purposes) during both the PE, KE, and MC stage (SP ATTACK1,
SP ATTACK11, SP ATTACK2). Similar to SP, IdP could also give the ARM easy to
fulfill conditions during the KE stage and MC stage (IDP ATTACK1, IDP ATTACK2,
and IDP ATTACK3). In total, there are 7 avenues in which such an attack could
be launched and they are parameterized into the model. We expect that the
PIEMCP-NT protocol to be able to detect such attacks during the PK-VE or
TPM proof verification process and therefore, the protocol stops if any of these
attacks is launched. Specifically, we need to show that a secure protocol must
behave as follows:
– when USER ATTACK1 or SP ATTACK1 is included, the PKVE operation should
fail and the protocol should terminate,
– when USER ATTACK4, SP ATTACK11, or IDP ATTACK1 is included, the TPM
Proof verification by the ARM should fail and protocol terminates,
– when SP ATTACK2, IDP ATTACK2, or IDP ATTACK3 is included, the user must
be able to detect it and as a result, prevent the ARM from doing the re-
encryption of the VE private key.
The queries used to verify this behaviour are shown in Figure 16. The result
1 SP_ATTACK1
2 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_1.txt");
3 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used at PE stage:\n");
4 val PKVESuccessBE = PredAllArcs(
5 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
6 Bind.PE’IDP_GENERATES_STORES_PSEUDONYM_AND_SEND_TO_USER (1, {...} ) => true
7 | _ => false);
8 val correct1 = length PKVESuccessBE = 0;
9 if correct1 then TextIO.output
10 (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when incorrect conditions used at PE stage.\n\n") else
11 TextIO.output
12 (os, "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect conditions used at PE stage. \n\n");
13 TextIO.closeOut os;
14
15 USER_ATTACK4, SP_ATTACK11, IDP_ATTACK1
16 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_2.txt");
17 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used during KE stage:\n");
18 val deadTrans = ListDeadTIs();
19 val expectedDeadTran1 =
20 if List.exists (fn y => TI.KE’ARM_VERIFIES_MODULE_1_TPM_PROOF 1=y) deadTrans
21 then true else false;
22 if expectedDeadTran1 then TextIO.output
23 (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when incorrect conditions used at KE stage.\n\n") else
24 TextIO.output(os,
25 "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect conditions used at KE stage.\n\n");
26 TextIO.closeOut os;
27
28 SP_ATTACK2, IDP_ATTACK2, IDP_ATTACK3
29 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_3.txt");
30 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used during MC stage:\n");
31 val deadTrans = ListDeadTIs();
32 val expectedDeadTran =
33 if List.exists (fn y => TI.MC’ARM_REENCRYPTS_KVE_AND_SIGNS_REENCRYPTED_KVE 1=y) deadTrans
34 then true else false;
35 if expectedDeadTran1 then TextIO.output
36 (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when incorrect conditions used at MC stage.\n\n") else
37 TextIO.output(os,
38 "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect conditions used at MC stage.\n\n");
39
40 TextIO.closeOut os;
Fig. 16. Queries to verify Condition Abused Resistant - with attacks
of the queries show that the condition abused resistant property is satisfied even
in the presence of malicious behaviours.
Session Linkability
Property 6 (Escrow Session Unlinkability). SPs and IdPs must not be able
to link a user from one escrow session to another from the session data gathered.
In the absence of attack model, this property can be verified by showing that
that multiple session executions of the escrow session do not leave any session
data which can be used to link these sessions to the same user. In other words,
each escrow session data (including VE public key, VE ciphertext, IBEPRE
ciphertext, conditions, and so on) must be unique to that session only. The
queries used to verify this property is shown in Figure 17. From the queries, we
1 val os = TextIO.openOut("linkable.txt");
2
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val idpRec1 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt");
10 val idpRec2 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt");
11
12 val sameCond1 =
13 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) andalso
14 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp1Rec1) andalso
15 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) andalso
16 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp1Rec2);
17
18 val sameCond2 =
19 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) andalso
20 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso
21 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) andalso
22 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp2Rec2);
23
24 val diffCond = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) <> #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1));
25 val condConsistent = sameCond1 andalso sameCond2 andalso diffCond;
26
27 val oneTimeVEKeys = #veKeys(userRec1) <> #veKeys(userRec2);
28 val oneTimeVEPub = #vePubKey(idpRec1) <> #vePubKey(idpRec2);
29
30 val oneTimeVeCipher = #cipherVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
31 #cipherVE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp2Rec2);
32
33 val oneTimePre = #cipherPRE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherPRE(sp1Rec2) andalso
34 #cipherPRE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherPRE(sp2Rec2) andalso
35 #cipherPRE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherPRE(sp2Rec1) andalso
36 #cipherPRE(sp1Rec2) <> #cipherPRE(sp2Rec2)
37
38 val oneTimePseudo = #pseudo(userRec1) <> #pseudo(userRec2)
39
40 val linkable = condConsistent andalso oneTimeVEKeys andalso oneTimeVEPub andalso
41 oneTimeVeCipher andalso oneTimePre andalso oneTimePseudo;
42
43 if linkable then TextIO.output(os, "Session unlinkability is SATISFIED") else
44 TextIO.output(os, "Session Unlinkability is NOT SATISFIED");
45
46 TextIO.closeOut os;
Fig. 17. Queries to verify Session Unlinkability property - no attacks
have confirmed that this property is satisfied.
At this point, we do not find any plausible attack scenarios that could vi-
olate this property. Due to the non-deterministic nature of the cryptographic
primitives used, and due to the zero-knowledge property, the IdPs and SPs will
not know the identity of the user, and thus, do not have the knowledge to tell
if they are interacting with the same user across multiple escrow sessions. This
property may be violated if a user applies the same session data (such as same
VE keys, same conditions string) across multiple escrow sessions. Nevertheless,
such actions contradict users’ interest (which is to preserve their privacy) and
are therefore not considered as a valid ‘attack’.
5.5 Removing trusted ARM
The need to place a certain amount of trust on a PKG is inherent in most
of the identity-based encryption schemes [23]. In PIEMCP, although the ARM
plays the role of a PKG, we do not assume that it is a fully trusted entity
either. Instead, we assume a stronger threat model whereby an ARM can be
opportunistic but risk-averse (see Section 2 for details). Nevertheless, there may
be situations when the existence of such an ARM is not possible. In this case,
an alternate solution to PIEMCP is required. We can extend the PIEMCP to
cope with this situation in a fairly straightforward manner. An outline of how
we can remove the need for a trusted ARM is given in this section.
The PE stage remains the same. However, during the KE stage, instead of
using an IBEPRE scheme, we require the user to encrypt the generated one-time
VE private key using the custodian-hiding group encryption scheme [24] under
Conditions1. Essentially, this encryption scheme allows users to distribute the
trust from a single ARM to a set of n referees. The MC stage in this scenario
is similar to the KE stage: the user has to perform another group encryption of
the one-time VE private key, but this time under a different set of conditions
Conditions2. During revocation, at least k (k ≤ n) referees have to agree of the
conditions fulfillment before the VE private key can be recovered. Obviously, to
reap the benefits of a group encryption, we require that at least k > 1.
Performing the custodian-hiding group encryption requires a significant amount
of computational resources. Having to perform such an encryption multiple times
with each of the SPs within a session will severely reduce the performance of the
system, especially for the users. Nevertheless, such a reduction in performance
may be acceptable in exchange of a stronger privacy protection.
6 Performance Analysis of FSSO-PIEMC
We measure the performance of PIEMCP using the number of cryptographic
operations that have to be performed by users, IdP, SP, and ARM. We show
that our protocol provides a significantly better efficiency as compared to the
existing approach [1].
Players User IdP SP ARM
PII + Key Max d(comm+Enc(VE)+ d(PK-comm 1 Sign + 1 DAA + 1 Sign
Escrow PK-comm+PK-VE) + + PK-VE) + 1 Verify + 2 Verify
(1st SP) 1 DAA + 1 Sign + 2 Sign +
+ 1 Enc(IBEPRE) 2 Verify
Opt 1 DAA + 2 Sign + 1 Sign + 1 DAA + 1 Sign
1 Enc(IBEPRE) 2 Verify 1 Verify 1 + Verify
+ 1 Sign
Each of the next 1 Sign + 2 Sign + 1 Sign + 2 Sign + 2 Verify
r SPs (MC) 1 Verify 2 Verify 1 Verify + 1 Renc(IBEPRE)
Revocation 1 Sign + 1 Verify +
1 Dec(IBEPRE) 1 Extract
+ d(Dec(VE) 1 Sign
1 Verify + 1 Enc
1 Dec
Table 3. Online Performance Summary for PIEMCP
Players User IdP SP ARM
PIEMCP d(PK-comm + PK-VE + d(PK-comm + 1 DAA +
Enc(VE) + comm) + 1 DAA PK-VE) r Renc(IBEPRE)
Existing r × d(PK-comm r × d(PK-comm
Approach [1] + + PK-VE) + PK-VE)
Table 4. Performance Comparison between PIEMCP and the existing approach [1]
for interactions with r-number of SPs in a session
We base the calculation on the number of signature creation (Sign), signature
verification (Verify), generic encryption and decryption (Enc and Dec), com-
mitments generations (comm), encryption and decryption of VE (Enc(VE) and
Dec(VE)), PK operations for proving correct commitments (PK-comm), PK op-
erations for proving correct VE encryptions (PK-VE), execution of the DAA pro-
tocol (DAA), the encryptions and decryptions operations for the IBEPRE scheme
(Enc(IBEPRE)) and (Dec(IBEPRE)), IBEPRE re-encryption (Renc(IBEPRE)),
and IBEPRE private key extraction (Ext(IBEPRE)).
Of these operations, the PK-VE, PK-comm, and DAA, consume the most compu-
tational resources as they require numerous computationally-intensive modular
exponentiations (modex). As an example, based on a rough estimate, the PK-VE
operation requires a prover (e.g. a user) to perform roughly 10 modex, while a
verifier (e.g. an IdP) needs to perform approximately 13 modex - see [25] for
details.
Table 3 summarizes the total on-line cryptographic operations for PIEMCP.
As explained in Section 4, the first round of interaction between a user and an
SP triggers the PE and KE stages. Subsequent interactions with other SPs only
trigger the execution of the MC stage. Therefore, Table 3 breaks the required
cryptographic operation between the PE+KE stages (combined), the MC stage,
and the revocation stage.
The proposed PIEMCP suffers from inefficient first-round operation (PE and
KE stages) for the user, IdP, and ARM due to the required PK-comm, PK-VE,
and DAA operations. However, the efficiency of the subsequent rounds is massively
improved, especially for the users who only need to do one signature generation
and one signature verification - a very useful property for users with low-powered
devices. Of course, the majority of operations is now transfered to the ARM who
has to perform a re-encryption (which may include a private key extraction and
a re-encryption key generation) for each of the r SPs. However, even so, they are
all based on efficient elliptic curve cryptography operations. Besides, it is very
likely that an ARM would operate using a system with a considerable amount
of computational powers.
Comparison to Existing appraoch Assume we need to escrow d-number of PII.
In the existing approach, every single interaction with a different SP requires the
execution of the PII escrow operation: for d PII to escrow, a user has to generate
d commitments and d VE encryptions. In addition, the user and the SP have to
perform d(PK-comm + PK-VE). So, if a user in a session interacts with r number
of SPs, a user has to perform r × d(commitments + VE + PK-comm + PK-VE)
operations, while the each SP has to perform r × d(PK-comm + PK-VE).
To simplify the comparison, let us just consider the main cryptographic op-
erations: Enc(VE), comm, PK-comm, PK-VE, DAA, and Renc(IBEPRE). See Table
4 for a summary of the performance comparison. In comparison with the ex-
isting approach, the PIEMCP improves the performance by roughly a factor
of r: regardless of the number of SPs a user interacts with in a session,the
PIEMCP only has to perform the resources-intensive cryptographic operations
(PK-comm, PK-VE, DAA) once. While the ARM still has to perform roughly r
Renc(IBEPRE), such operations require a much less computational resources as
compared to performing r × d(comm + Enc(VE) + PK-comm + PK-VE).
The recent advancement in the ACS [26] improves the performance of the
system by significantly reducing the computational complexity required to prove
the knowledge and properties of users PII in a certificate. Neverthless, in terms of
performance, our initial investigation shows at least one PK operation still has
to be executed with each SP. Besides, it is not evident that such a performance
improvement also applies to the PII escrow operation which is the main focus of
this paper.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed a protocol which allows an escrow of users PII bound to
multiple conditions. The PIEMCP proposed requires less trust to be placed on
the ARM while achieving a significantly better performance in comparison to
the existing approach [1]. The achievement of its security properties have also
been formally verified.
Future work involve investigating into the possibility of using the improved
ACS [26] into PIEMCP in order to further boost its performance. Extending
the use of the extended TPM technology at the SPs, IdP, and ARM sides may
possibly further improve the protocol efficiency and further reduce the trust
placed on the ARM.
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